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Results
ConclusionAbstract
This paper analyzes the equilibrium level of private credit to GDP
in 11 Central and Eastern European countries in order to see whether
the high credit growth recently observed in some of these countries led to
above equilibrium private credit-to-GDP levels. We use estimation results
obtained for a panel of small open OECD economies (out-of-sample panel)
to derive the equilibrium credit level for a panel of transition economies
(in-sample panel). We opt for this (out-of-sample) approach because the
coe¢ cient estimates for transition economies are fairly unstable. We show
that there is a large amount of uncertainty to determine the equilibrium
level of private credit. Yet our results indicate that a number of countries
are very close or even above the estimated equilibrium levels, whereas
others are still well below the equilibrium level.
JEL: C31, C33, E44, G21
Keywords: credit to the private sector, credit growth, equilibrium
level of credit, initial undershooting, transition economies
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October 2006Non-technical summary 
 
The emerging literature on credit growth in transition economies has documented that lending to 
the private sector has recently grown dynamically in a number of transition economies. This can 
be attributed to a number of factors, including macroeconomic stabilization, comprehensive 
reforms and privatization in the financial sector, the introduction of market institutions and legal 
reforms. However, given the size of the recent boom in bank lending in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) some commentators have questioned whether the growth rates recorded in these 
countries can be viewed as sustainable in the medium to long run. 
In order to answer this question, this paper investigates the determinants of domestic credit to 
the private sector as a percentage of GDP in 11 CEE countries as well as the equilibrium level 
of private credit-to-GDP ratio. We have tested our empirical specifications for a variety of 
panels composed of (1) transition economies, (2) developed small and large OECD countries 
and (3) emerging market economies from Asia and the Americas. 
The use of these panels provides some interesting perspectives. First, in-sample panels give 
useful insights regarding the major determinants of credit-to-GDP levels in CEE. Second, as 
financial depth in most transition economies remains comparatively low, it might well be that 
private credit-to-GDP ratios have still remained below their equilibrium levels for most of the 
last decade. This would give rise to a bias in the econometric estimates, as credit-to-GDP ratios 
tend to converge toward their equilibrium levels. To overcome this problem, we use estimates 
obtained from panels composed of small open OECD and emerging market economies from 
Asia and the Americas to obtain the equilibrium credit-to-GDP ratios for 11 CEE countries (out-
of-sample panels). 
Our results indicate that credit to the public sector (crowding out/crowding in), nominal interest 
rates, the inflation rate and the spread between lending and deposit rates aimed at capturing 
financial liberalization and competition in the banking sector turn out to be the major 
determinants of credit growth in the CEE-5, while GDP per capita is the only variable that 
enters the estimated equations in a robust manner for the Baltic and Southeastern European 
countries. Furthermore, we find the estimated coefficients for transition economies are much 
higher than those obtained for OECD and emerging market economies, which testifies to the 
bias caused by the initial undershooting of private credit to GDP in most countries. Another 
interesting result is that house prices are found to lead to an increase in private credit only in 
countries with high house price inflation. This finding disqualifies the house price variable from 
being included in the long-run equation to be used for the derivation of the equilibrium level of 
private credit.  
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October 2006Furthermore, we can draw some general conclusions with regard to undershooting and 
overshooting (i.e. deviations from the estimated equilibrium credit-to-GDP ratios) for transition 
economies, even though the application of the out-of-sample small open OECD panel to 
transition economies yields a wide corridor of deviations from the equilibrium. Considering the 
midpoint of the estimated interval, Croatia is the only country which might have reached the 
equilibrium by 2004. When looking at whole ranges, the upper edges of the estimated band 
reached equilibrium in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia, although the mass of 
the estimated deviation was still located mostly on the undershooting side in 2004. Moreover, it 
turns out that the initial overshooting might not ve been that large for the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, after all. Finally, it is interesting to see that the initial undershooting remains relatively 
stable for Lithuania, Poland and Romania throughout the period. Overall, our results suggest 
that the CEE countries cannot be generally regarded as (over)shooting stars in terms of their 
credit-to-GDP ratios despite robust credit growth observed in most of the countries.  
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The emerging literature on credit growth in transition economies has docu-
mented that lending to the private sector has recently grown dynamically in a
number of transition economies.1 This can be attributed to a number of fac-
tors, including macroeconomic stabilization, comprehensive reforms and priva-
tization in the ￿nancial sector, the introduction of market institutions and legal
reforms. However, given the size of the recent boom in bank lending in Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE) some commentators have questioned whether the
growth rates recorded in these countries can be viewed as sustainable in the
medium to long run.
In order to answer this question, this paper investigates the determinants
of domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP in 11 CEE
countries2 as well as the equilibrium level of private credit-to-GDP ratio. We
have tested our empirical speci￿cations for a variety of panels composed of (1)
transition economies, (2) developed small and large OECD countries and (3)
emerging market economies from Asia and the Americas.
The use of these panels provides some interesting perspectives. First, in-
sample panels give useful insights regarding the major determinants of credit-
to-GDP levels in CEE. Second, as ￿nancial depth in most transition economies
remains comparatively low, it might well be that private credit-to-GDP ratios
have still remained below their equilibrium levels for most of the last decade.
This would give rise to a bias in the econometric estimates, as credit-to-GDP
ratios tend to converge toward their equilibrium levels.3 To overcome this prob-
lem, we could use estimates obtained from panels composed of small open OECD
and emerging market economies from Asia and the Americas to obtain the equi-
librium credit-to-GDP ratios for 11 CEE countries.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some stylized facts
regarding credit growth in the transition economies. Section 3 brie￿ y overviews
the relevant literature, sketches the issue of initial undershooting and overshoot-
ing of the credit-to-GDP ratio, and examines their consequences for econometric
testing. Section 4 presents the economic speci￿cation used for the estimations
and describes the dataset and the estimation techniques. Section 5 then presents
and discusses the estimation results. Finally, Section 6 draws some concluding
remarks.
1See e.g. Cottarelli, Dell￿ Ariccia and Vladkova-Hollar (2003), Schadler (2005), BackØ and
Zumer (2005), Duenwald, Gueorguiev and Schaechter (2005), Pazarba‚ s￿o… glu et al. (2005),
Coricelli, Mucci and Revoltella (2006) and Hilbers, Otker-Robe and Pazarba‚ s‹ o… glu (2006).
2Countries included are Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
3An analogous line of reasoning is applied in the literature on equilibrium exchange rates
of CEE countries (Maeso-Fernandez, Osbath and Schnatz, 2005).
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To place credit developments in transition economies into context, it is useful to
recall that ￿nancial systems in these countries are bank-based ￿about 85% of
￿nancial sector assets are bank assets ￿and that capital markets (in particular
corporate bond and stock market segments) are generally not very developed.
This implies that bank credit is the main source of external ￿nancing in these
countries, although foreign direct investment (FDI) has also been important in
some countries. Banking sectors in transition economies in CEE have under-
gone a comprehensive transformation in the past 15 years or so, including wide-
ranging reforms of their regulatory frameworks and supervisory arrangements,
bank consolidation schemes and ￿in almost all countries ￿sweeping privatiza-
tion of ￿nancial institutions, mainly to foreign strategic owners (mostly ￿nancial
institutions based in ￿old￿EU Member States). Consequently, the governance
of banks has greatly improved, and the performance and health of these banking
sectors have advanced substantially, as standard prudential indicators show.4
In 2005, the banking systems￿capital adequacy ratios in the 11 countries
ranged from 10.6% (Slovenia) to 20.3% (Romania), with an unweighted average
of about 13%, well above the statutory minimum of 8% prescribed by the Basel
rules. Pro￿tability has risen considerably, as return on equity data show, and is
now above the EU average (about 13%) in most countries covered in this study
(see Chart 1). Asset quality has improved, as non-performing loan ratios have
fallen (see Chart 1). Reserves and provisions now cover a considerable part of
substandard assets in most of the countries under review here, as coverage ratios
ranged from 60% to 100% in 2005 in most cases, with an unweighted average of
about 85%.5
4On recent assessments of banking sector performance and strength in CEE countries
see e.g. ECB (2005a, 2005b and 2006), EBRD (2005), IMF (2005a, 2005b and 2006), IMF
Financial System Stability Assessments (http://www.imf.org/external/NP/fsap/fsap.asp).
5Romania (15%) and Hungary (44%) are outliers in this respect. It should be noted,
however, that a low coverage ratio is not necessarily problematic, as it can to some extent
re￿ect the classi￿cation and composition of non-performing assets. Moreover, a high level
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1998 2005
Source: National central banks.
Note: Return on equity: Slovakia: value 2000 (instead of 1998); Romania:
value 1999 (instead of 1998); Latvia: value 2004 (instead of 2005)
Nonperforming loans: Latvia: value 2004 (instead of 2005); no data available for Lithuania
Chart 2 gives an overview of the development of credit to the private sector
in percent of GDP from the early 1990s to 2004. Several observations can be
made on the basis of chart 1. Some countries, namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania and Slovenia, started transition with low credit-to-GDP ratios
of around 20%. Estonia and Latvia then recorded a marked increase in the
ratio, and the credit-to-GDP ratio also rose steadily in Slovenia from the early
1990s to 2004 although the overall increase was less pronounced than in the
two aforementioned Baltic countries. Credit growth has picked up only recently
in Lithuania and Romania, and for Poland, only a moderate increase can be
observed during the second half of the period studied.
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Source: Authors￿calculations based on data drawn from the IFS/IMF. For precise data de￿nitions,
see Section 4.2.
By contrast, the second group of countries, notably Croatia and Hungary,
started transition with higher credit-to-GDP ratios than the Baltic countries.
After dropping considerably to close to 20%, the ratio started to increase, reach-
ing pretransition levels in Hungary and growing to levels well exceeding 40% in
Croatia by 2004.
The third group of countries, comprising Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and
Slovakia, had the highest credit-to-GDP ratio at the beginning of the period
(between 60% and 80%). For Bulgaria, this ratio came down to 10% in 1997,
10
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also recorded a substantial contraction (to nearly 30% for both countries), while
the ratios seem to have stabilized during the last couple of years.
The di⁄erences in initial credit-to-GDP levels can be traced largely to dif-
ferent approaches with respect to the ￿nancing of (credit to) enterprises under
central planning across countries as well as strongly diverging in￿ ation (price
level adjustment) patterns across countries at the initial stage of transition. In
turn, major temporary contractions in credit-to-GDP ratios during the transi-
tion process have mainly been due to banking consolidation measures, by which
nonperforming assets were removed from banks￿balance sheets. Such nonper-
forming assets (mostly loans) had either been inherited from the previous era
of central planning or were built up in the early transition years, when banking
systems were still immature, ￿ awed by inadequate regulation, connected lending
and simple lack of experience.
3 The Equilibrium Level of Private Credit
3.1 Literature Overview
Several theoretical and empirical studies have dealt with credit growth, ￿nancial
deepening and lending booms. One body of literature on credit growth reviews
the determinants of credit demand and credit supply. In the models on credit
demand, real GDP, prices and interest rates are commonly the explanatory vari-
ables, although there is no ￿standard￿model is widely used. On the supply side,
a variety of credit channel models consider how changes in the ￿nancial positions
of banks (bank lending channel) and borrowers (balance sheet channel) a⁄ect
the availability of credit in an economy (see Hall, 2001, for a succinct overview).
However, modeling and estimation techniques in this area are complicated due
to di¢ culties in separating demand-side e⁄ects from supply-side e⁄ects (see e.g.
Rajan 1994).
Regarding the relationship between credit and growth, there are strong em-
pirical indications of a positive interaction between the two, usually with elastic-
ity higher than one in the long run. This implies that credit-to-GDP levels rise
as per capita GDP increases, a process which is denoted as ￿nancial deepening
(see Terrones and Mendoza, 2004 for a concise overview). In addition, empirical
studies have examined the direction of causality; with most results suggesting
that it is ￿nancial deepening which spurs economic development (see e.g. Beck,
Levine and Loayza, 2000, and Rajan and Zingales, 2001 for an overview). While
the results of this literature are appealing, it is di¢ cult to establish genuine
6Note that the peculiar and rather fuzzy pattern of the credit-to-GDP ratio in Bulgaria
shown in chart 1 is not due to data problems but, to a considerable extent, driven by exchange
rate movements. The ratio rose sharply in 1994, 1996 and 1997 because of the depreciation of
the domestic currency vis-￿-vis the U.S. dollar, considering that a signi￿cant share of credit
was denominated in foreign currency (mainly U.S. dollars). Correction of the credit ratio
occurred in the post-crisis period because of the appreciation of the domestic currency and
because of the write-o⁄ of nonperforming loans.
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and growth as well as country heterogeneity add to the problems of empirical
analysis in this area (see discussion in Favara, 2003).
The literature on lending booms has identi￿ed four main triggers: (i) real
business cycles caused by technological or terms-of-trade shocks (with highly
pro-cyclical output elasticity of credit demand), (ii) ￿nancial liberalization of
an initially repressed ￿nancial system, (iii) capital in￿ ows triggered by exter-
nal factors, and (iv) wealth shocks originating from comprehensive structural
reforms (see Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche (2001) for a survey). In
addition, less than fully credible policies (in particular exchange rate-based sta-
bilizations) can also play a role in spurring credit booms, by setting o⁄ an
unsustainable consumption boom (see Calvo and Vegh (1999) for a review).
Moreover, the ￿nancial acceleration literature, including the more recent liter-
ature on credit cycles, gives some theoretical insights into the mechanisms that
drive or amplify credit expansions, which turn out to be non-sustainable and
thus ultimately require a correction (Terrones and Mendoza, 2004). There is
little evidence in the empirical literature that lending booms typically lead to
￿nancial crises. As Gourinchas, Valdes and Landerretche. (2001) point out,
while the conditional probability of a lending boom occurring before a ￿nancial
crisis may be quite high, this does not tell us much about the converse, i.e. the
conditional probability that a ￿nancial crisis will follow a lending boom.7
3.2 Initial Under- and Overshooting in Transition Economies
The question of whether or not credit growth in transition economies is exces-
sive is closely related to the issue of what the equilibrium level of the stock of
bank credit to the private sector as a share of GDP in those countries is. In
this study, we de￿ne the equilibrium level of private credit as the level of private
credit, which would be justi￿ed by the economic fundamentals. Deviations from
the equilibrium level occur if changes in the private credit-to-GDP ratio cannot
be explained by changes in the economic fundamentals (so-called undershoot-
ing and overshooting). Hence, our notion of equilibrium is very close to the
one used for instance in the literature on equilibrium exchange rates (Behav-
ioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate - BEER) and in other ￿elds of the economic
profession.8
Chart 3 demonstrate when moving from point A through B to C, the level
7The ￿nancial accelerator literature, including the more recent literature on credit cycles,
gives some theoretical insights into the mechanisms that drive or amplify credit expansions,
which later on turn out to be non-sustainable and thus ultimately require a correction. Over-
shooting, to give just one example, may occur if bank managers follow overly loose credit
policies in order to boost current bank earnings at the expense of future earnings. Moreover,
as information externalities make banks￿credit policies interdependent, banks coordinate and
tighten credit policy in the event of an adverse shock to borrowers (Rajan, 1994).
8Note that our de￿nition of equilibrium is not suitable for analyzing the connection be-
tween credit growth and external sustainability, ￿nancial stability aspects of credit growth
or the optimal currency (foreign currency vs. domestic currency) or sectoral (households vs.
corporate sector) composition of the credit-to-GDP ratio.
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depicted trajectory of the increase in the credit-to-GDP ratio (credit growth)
can be thought of as an equilibrium phenomenon.
However, we may also think of a situation when the observed credit-to-GDP
ratio is out of tune with economic fundamentals. For example, Point A￿depicts
the situation when the initial credit-to-GDP ratio is higher than what the level
of economic development would justify (initial overshooting), whereas Point A￿
shows where this ratio is lower (initial undershooting). In these cases, credit
growth should di⁄er from the equilibrium rate of growth, and this would secure
the return to the equilibrium level of the credit-to-GDP ratio.9
Initial undershooting (Point A￿ ) may be important for transition economies,
most of which started their economic transformation process with lower levels
of credit-to-GDP ratios than other countries at the same level of development
would have in other parts of the world. This is the heritage of central plan-
ning as under the Communist regimes the ￿nancial sector was underdeveloped.
Hence, once economic transformation from central planning to market is com-
pleted, higher credit growth in the transition economies may partly re￿ ect the
correction from this initial undershooting to the equilibrium level of the credit-
to-GDP ratio. This is shown in Chart 3, where the move from A￿ to B can
be decomposed into (a) equilibrium credit growth, given by A￿to B￿ , and (b)
the adjustment from initial undershooting to equilibrium (from B￿to B). How-
ever, in cases of high credit growth rates, the increase in credit to GDP may
be even higher than justi￿ed by the equilibrium change and the correction from
the initial undershooting. The move from A￿to B￿on Chart 3 indicates such
an overshooting, where the excessive increase in credit to GDP is given by the
distance between B and B￿ .
3.3 The Consequences of an Initial Under- or Overshoot-
ing
If there is initial undershooting or overshooting at the beginning of the transition
process and if the adjustment toward equilibrium occurs gradually (implying
persistent initial undershooting or overshooting), the use of panels that only
include transition economies may lead to severely biased constant terms and
coe¢ cient estimates, as put forward in the context of equilibrium exchange
rates by Maeso-Fernandez, Osbat and Schnatz (2005). When regressing the
observed credit-to-GDP ratio moving from A￿to B (instead of the equilibrium
change from A to B) on a set of fundamentals, the slope coe¢ cient would su⁄er
from an obvious upward bias. By the same token, the constant term will be
lower than it would be in the absence of an initial undershooting.
9In both cases, credit growth is expressed in terms of GDP. For example, credit growth
([C(t)-C(t-1)]/C(t-1) is higher for countries with lower credit-to-GDP levels than for countries
with higher credit-to-GDP levels if both countries have similar credit-to-GDP ￿ows. Hence,
it is more appropriate to relate changes in credit to the GDP to avoid this distortion (Arpa,
Reininger and Walko, 2005), as we do in this study.
13
ECB
Working Paper Series No 687
October 2006This is why it is advisable to use panels including countries which do not
exhibit an initial undershooting or overshooting in the credit-to-GDP ratio or to
use out-of-sample panels for the analysis of the equilibrium level of the credit-
to-GDP ratio of transition economies.
Chart 3. The Evolution of the Credit-to-GDP Ratio
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3.4 The Empirical Literature on Transition Economies
Cottarelli, Dell￿ Ariccia and Vladkova-Hollar (2005) were the ￿rst to estimate a
model of the long-term relationship between the private sector credit/GDP ratio
and a set of variables (see table 1) for a panel of non-transition economies. Sub-
sequently, they produce out-of-sample estimates for private sector credit/GDP
ratios of 15 CEE countries. As actual private sector credit-to-GDP levels were
considerably lower in 2002 than the authors￿estimates of the expected long-term
credit/GDP ratios they conclude that private-sector bank credit levels in that
year were not inconsistent with the structural characteristics of the economies
under examination.
We are aware of two other recent studies, which also investigate the equi-
librium level of private credit and the possible ￿excessiveness￿of credit growth
in transition economies. Boissay, Calvo-Gonzalez and Kozluk (2006) ￿rst esti-
mate time series models including GDP-per-capita and real interest rates for a
14
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ratios. They then compare the average of the credit growth rates for tran-
sition economies obtained using the error correction speci￿cations estimated
for the developed countries with the observed credit growth in the transition
economies. They also estimate time series models for transition economies,
which include the real interest rate, a quadratic trend and a dummy aimed at
capturing changes in credit growth after 2001. Their results indicate excessive
credit growth in the three Baltic States and in Bulgaria and to a lesser extent
also in Hungary and Croatia. At the same time, credit growth in Romania and
Slovenia seems to be non-excessive.10
The study by Kiss, Nagy and VonnÆk (2006) estimates a dynamic panel
(Pooled Mean Group Estimator) model including GDP-per-capita, real interest
rate and in￿ ation of 11 euro area countries (excluding Luxembourg) to gener-
ate out-of-sample estimates for private sector credit-to-GDP ratios of the three
Baltic countries and of the CEE-5 (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia
and Slovenia). They ￿nd that only Estonia and Latvia may have come close re-
cently to equilibrium while the other countries have credit-to-GDP ratios below
the estimated equilibrium levels. Besides being above the estimated equilibrium
credit level, they de￿ne two other criteria which may indicate a credit boom:
(a) if the observed credit growth exceeds the one implied by the long-run equi-
librium relationship and (b) if the observed growth rate is higher than the speed
of adjustment to equilibrium in the error-correction model. Overall, they ￿nd
that the risk of a credit boom is high in both Estonia and Latvia according to
these criteria, whereas Hungary, Lithuania and Slovenia might be in the danger
zone because the observed growth rates are higher than the one derived from
the long-run equilibrium relationship. In addition, they argue that possible
credit booms are mainly due to credit expansion to households and not to the
non￿nancial corporate sector.11
We contribute to this literature by expanding the list of countries (11 transi-
tion, OECD and emerging market economies), the list of explanatory variables,
by constructing carefully several possible benchmark country groups which share
common characteristics with the transition economies (emerging markets, small
emerging markets, small and open OECD countries) and by performing exten-
sive sensitivity analysis of the estimation results.
10Two observations come to mind with regard to this paper. First, the quadratic trend may
capture missing variables from their model (which indeed only contains real interest rates)
and explosive trends due to credit boom or to adjustment from initial undershooting of credit
levels. It is in fact surprising to see that a sizeable number of countries have excessive credit
growth given that the quadratic trend has a very good ￿t thus leaving very little unexplained
variation in the credit series. Second, the authors use Euribor for their only macroeconomic
variable, the real interest rate. This may be problematic because some foreign currency
denominated loans are linked to other currencies than the euro for instance in Hungary but
also because Euribor neglects the country risk and default risk at the micro level.
11It may be noted that the two additional criteria used by the authors have some draw-
backs. First, the observed growth rates may be in excess of the one derived from the long-run
equilibrium relationship because of the adjustment from initial undershooting. Second, the
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4.1 The Empirical Model
Most studies investigating credit growth employ a simple set of explanatory
variables (see Table 1), which usually includes GDP per capita or real GDP,
some kind of (real or nominal) interest rate and the in￿ ation rate (Calza et
al., 2001, 2003; Brzoza-Brzezina, 2005; Boissay, Calvo-Gonzalez and Kozluk,
2006 and Kiss, Nagy and VonnÆk, 2006). Hofmann (2001) extends this list by
house prices, a very important variable, because a rise in house prices is usually
accompanied by an increase in credit to the private sector.
Cottarelli et al. (2005) use indicators capturing factors that drive the private
credit-to-GDP ratio. These variables describe the degree of ￿nancial liberaliza-
tion, the quality and implementation of accounting standards, entry restrictions
to the banking sector and the origin of the legal system. Finally, they use a mea-
sure of public debt aimed at analyzing possible crowding-out (or crowding-in)
e⁄ects.
Table 1. Overview of Papers Analyzing the Determinants of Credit Growth
Authors Dependent variable Explanatory variables
Calza et al. (2001) Real loans
GDP per capita in PPS, short-term
and long-term real interest rates
Hofmann (2001) Real loans Real GDP, real interest rate, housing prices
Calza et al. (2003) Real loans
Real GDP growth, nominal lending rate,
in￿ation rate
Brzoza-Brzezina (2005) Real loans Real GDP growth, real interest rate
Cottarelli et al. (2005)
Credit to the private
sector (%GDP)
GDP per capita in PPS, in￿ation rate,
￿nancial liberalisation index,
accounting standards,
entry restrictions to the banking sector,
German origin of legal system, public debt
Boissay et al. (2006)
Credit to the private
sector (%GDP)
GDP per capita, real interest rate (Euribor),
quadratic trend
Kiss et al. (2006)
Credit to the private
sector (%GDP)
GDP per capita, real interest rate
in￿ation rate
Note: GDP per capita in PPS (purchasing power standards)
is obtained by converting GDP per capita ￿gures using
the nominal exchange rate given by the domestic and foreign price levels (P/P*).
The economic speci￿cation which we estimate for the private credit-to-GDP
ratio relies on explanatory variables used in previous studies, but also extends
them. We consider the following variables:
1.) GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power standards (PPS) (CAPITA
). An increase in per capita GDP is expected to result in an increase in credit
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production (ip ) to check for the robustness of the GDP per capita variable and
to see to what extent these variables, which are used interchangeably in the
literature, are substitutes.
2.) Bank credit to the government sector as a percentage of GDP (CG ).
As this variable captures possible crowding-out e⁄ects, any increase (decrease)
in bank credit to the government sector is thought to give rise to a decrease
(increase) in bank credit to the private sector. It should be noted that bank
credit to the government measures crowding out better than public debt as
employed in Cottarelli et al. (2005), because public debt also includes loans
taken out abroad and because public entities may well ￿nance themselves on
the securities markets. Moreover, public debt is subject to valuation and stock-
￿ ow adjustments.
3.) Short-term and long-term nominal lending interest rates (i ). Lower
interest rates should promote credit to the private sector, implying a negative
sign for this variable. Calza et al. (2001) use both short-term and long-term
interest rates, arguing that whether either rates play a more important role
depends on the respective share of loans with ￿xed interest rates and variable
interest rates. Because the nominal lending interest rates used in the paper show
a high correlation with short-term interest rates (three-month Treasury bills and
money market rates), short-term interest rates are used as a robustness check
rather than as an additional variable.
4.) In￿ ation (p ). High in￿ ation is thought to be associated with a drop
in bank credit to the private sector. In￿ ation is measured both in terms of the
producer price index (PPI) and the consumer price index (CPI).
5.) House prices (phouse ). There are a number of reasons why changes in
housing prices might lead to changes in credit demand. First, increases in hous-
ing prices result in a rise in the total amount which has to be spent to purchase
a given residential or commercial property. This is subsequently re￿ ected in an
increase in demand for credit through which the higher purchasing price can
be fully or partly ￿nanced. This means that an increase in housing prices may
generate more credit to the private sector. Second, rising housing prices may
generate a rise in credit demand of homeowners as higher housing prices increase
lifetime wealth according to Modigliani￿ s lifecycle theory, which in turn leads
to consumption smoothing by means of more borrowing. By contrast, higher
housing prices are usually connected to higher rents, which decrease borrowing
of renters (Hofmann, 2001). Third, credit demand may be a⁄ected by housing
prices because Tobin￿ s q theory is also applicable to the housing market. For
example, a higher-than-unity q implies market value above replacement cost,
and this promotes construction production, which is re￿ ected in higher demand
for loans. Changes in commercial and residential property prices also have an
in￿ uence on credit supply. According to the broad lending channel, net wealth,
serving as collateral for credit, determine the capacity of ￿rms and household
to borrow externally. Put di⁄erently, higher housing prices resulting in rising
net wealth increase the amount of credit provided by banks. Overall, both
credit supply and demand bear a positive relationship to housing prices from a
17
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theoretical viewpoint.However, a fundamental problem arising here is whether price increases in
the real estate market are driven by fundamental factors or whether they re￿ ect
a bubble. If price developments in the real estate market mirror changes in
fundamentals, such as the quality of housing or adjustments to the underlying
fundamentals, the ensuing rise in the stock of credit can be viewed as an equi-
librium phenomenon. In contrast, in the event that high credit growth is due
to the development of a housing price bubble due to speculation, the accompa-
nying credit growth is a disequilibrium phenomenon from the point of view of
long-term credit stock.
6.) The degree of liberalization of the ￿nancial sector, in particular that
of the banking sector. A higher degree of ￿nancial liberalization makes it easier
for banks to fund credit supply. Because the ￿nancial liberalization indices
(finlib ) used in Abiad and Mody (2003) and Cottarelli et al. (2005) only
partially match our country and time coverage, we use in addition the spread
between lending and deposit rates to capture ￿nancial liberalization. A decrease
in the spread can be an indication of ￿nancial liberalization in particular if it
re￿ ects more intensive competition among banks and also between banks and
other ￿nancial intermediaries. It should be noted, however, that the spread
variables could also capture other factors than ￿nancial liberalization.12 With
this caveat and limitation in mind, spread variables are still the most appropriate
variables to capture ￿nancial liberalization that are available for all the countries
in the di⁄erent panels covered in this study.
7.) Public and private credit registries ( reg). The existence of credit
registries diminishes problems related to asymmetric information and the prob-
ability of credit fraud. This in turn leads to an increase in the supply of bank
credit, all things being equal.1314
For some of the variables, it is notoriously di¢ cult to separate whether they
in￿ uence the demand for or the supply of credit. For instance, GDP per capita
and the interest rate variables could a⁄ect both credit demand and supply.
These problems were tackled in the literature on the credit channel by the
use of bank- and ￿rm-level data.15 However, given that we are interested in
aggregated macroeconomic variables, these identi￿cation issues are beyond the
scope of this paper.
Our baseline speci￿cation includes per capita GDP, bank credit to the public
sector, nominal lending rates, in￿ ation rates and ￿nancial liberalization based
12Note e.g. that the recent decline in the absolute level of spreads may be partly due to
record low global interest rates.
13In contrast to Cottarelli et al. (2005), for econometric reasons, we do not include a
variable that captures the tradition of legal systems of countries, which can a⁄ect ￿nancial
development. The mean group estimator (MGE) estimation methods in section 5 do not allow
the use of dummy variables that take a value of zero throughout the entire period.
14We are aware of the fact that the registry variable may not capture how credit contracts
are enforced in courts. However, even though an easier seizure of collateral by banks may
spark credit to households and small ￿rms, such growth will probably be re￿ected in a one-o⁄
spike in growth rates.
15For an overview, see e.g. Kierzenkowski (2004).
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where CP is bank credit to the private sector expressed as a share of GDP.
In addition, it is worthwhile checking whether the robustness of the variables
included in equation (1) is a⁄ected by the use of alternative measures often
used in the literature (e.g. replacing GDP per capita by real GDP growth
and real industrial production, or long-term lending rates by short-term lending
rates, and the PPI by the CPI). These alternative variables are subsequently

























































The sensitivity check to the alternative speci￿cation is then followed by the




























The ￿rst step is to check whether our series are stationary in levels. Four panel
unit root tests are applied: the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), the Breitung (2000),
the Hadri (2000) and the Im-Pesaran-Shin (2003) tests. The ￿rst three assume
common unit roots across panel members, while the Im-Pesaran-Shin test allows
for cross-country heterogeneity. A further di⁄erence is that the Hadri test tests
the null of no unit root against the alternative of a unit root, whereas the
remaining tests take the null of a unit root against the alternative of no unit
root.
If the series turn out to be nonstationary in levels but stationary in ￿rst
di⁄erences, the coe¢ cients of the long-term relationships for the relationships
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niques: a.) ￿xed-e⁄ect ordinary least squares (FE_OLS); b.) panel dynamic
OLS estimates (DOLS) and c.) the mean group estimator (MGE) proposed by
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999).
The panel dynamic OLS, which is the mean group of individual DOLS es-
timates, accounts for the endogeneity of the regressors and serial correlation in
the residuals in the simple OLS setting by incorporating leads and lags of the
regressors in ￿rst di⁄erences. The panel DOLS can be written for panel member
as follows:
Yi:t = ￿0 +
n X
h=1





￿i;h;;j ￿ ￿Xi;h;t￿j + "i;t (9)
where ki;1 and ki;2 denote respectively leads and lags and the cointegrating
vector ￿0 contains the long-term coe¢ cients of the explanatory variables (with
h = 1;::;n ) for each panel member i.
The mean group estimator (MGE) is based on the error correction form of
the ARDL model, which is given for panel member i as shown in equation (10)
where the dependent variable in ￿rst di⁄erences is regressed on the lagged values














where li;1 and li;2 are the maximum lags. The long-term coe¢ cients ( ￿
0)
are obtained by normalizing vector ￿
0 on ￿.
Finally, we use the error correction term (￿) obtained from the error-correction
speci￿cation of the mean group estimator as tests for cointegration. A negative




The estimations are carried out for quarterly data covering 43 countries, which
are grouped into three main panels: (a) developed OECD countries, (b) emerg-
ing markets from Asia and the Americas16 and (c) CEE transition economies.
The OECD panel is further split into two subpanels: (a) small OECD countries
16Argentina (AR), Brazil (BR), Chile (CL), India (IN), Indonesia (ID), Israel (IL), Mexico
(MX), Peru (PE), the Philippines (PH), South Africa (ZA), South Korea (KR), Thailand
(TH). Although South Korea and Mexico are OECD countries, they can be viewed as catching-
up emerging market economies for most of the period investigated in this paper.
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OECD countries.18 The CEE panel consists of 11 transition economies and is
also subdivided into three presumably more homogeneous groups: (a) the Baltic
countries (B-3): Estonia (EE), Latvia (LV) and Lithuania (LT), (b) the CEE-
5: the Czech Republic (CZ), Hungary (HU), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK) and
Slovenia (SI), and (c) Southeastern Europe (SEE-3): Bulgaria (BG), Croatia
(HR) and Romania (RO). The sample begins between 1975 and 1980 for the
OECD countries, between 1980 and 1993 for the emerging market economies,
and between 1990 and 1996 for the transition economies; it ends in 2004.19
Panel unit root tests are employed for level data and for ￿rst-di⁄erenced
data. While the test results show that most of the series are I(1) processes, in
some cases, the tests yield con￿ icting results for level data. However, since the
tests do not indicate unambiguously in any case that the series are stationary
in level, we conclude that they are I(1).20
When analyzing possible long-term relationships between the private credit-
to-GDP ratio on the one hand and the explanatory variables on the other, one
has to make sure that the variables are cointegrated. As explained earlier, the
error correction terms (￿ ) issued from the estimated error correction form of the
MGE are used for this purpose. The variables are connected via a cointegrating
vector in the event that the error correction term is statistically signi￿cant and
has a negative sign. According to the results shown in Table 2 below, most of
the error correction terms ful￿ll this double criterion. A notable exception is
the panel composed of the three Baltic countries, as there seems to be only one
cointegration relationship out of the eight tested equations.
17Austria (AT), Australia (AU), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Denmark (DK), Finland
(FI), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), the Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NO),
Portugal (PT), Spain (ES) and Sweden (SE).
18Germany (DE), France (FR), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), the United Kingdom (UK) and the
United States (US).
19The dataset is unbalanced, as the length of the individual data series depends largely on
data availability. All data are transformed into logs. See Appendix A for a detailed description
of the source and the time span for variables.
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October 2006Table 2 Error Correction Terms (￿) from the Mean Group Estimator
Estimations, Equation 1 to Equation 7
Large OECD Small OECD EM CEE-11 CEE-5 B-3 SEE
Eq.1 -0.094*** -0.063*** -0.132*** -0.281*** -0.225*** -0.103 -0.551***
Eq.2 -0.088*** -0.052*** -0.135*** -0.174*** -0.188*** -0.052 -0.273***
Eq.3 -0.092*** -0.055*** -0.202*** -0.188*** -0.183*** -0.135** -0.248***
Eq.4 -0.097*** -0.069*** -0.189*** -0.226*** -0.136*** -0.049 -0.553***
Eq.5 -0.097*** -0.057*** -0.215*** -0.198*** -0.207*** -0.066 -0.315***
Eq.6 -0.160*** -0.049** -0.211*** -0.233*** -0.269*** -0.120 -0.285**
Eq.7 -0.980*** -0.003** -0.134*** -0.227*** -0.231*** -0.033 -0.414**
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% signi￿cance levels, respectively.
EM is the panel including emerging market economies.
.
We can now turn to the coe¢ cient estimates, which are displayed in Table 3
and in the Appendix C. GDP per capita enters the long-run relationship with
the expected positive sign for the OECD and the emerging market panels. This
result is particularly robust for small OECD and emerging market economies,
with the size of the coe¢ cient usually lying somewhere between 0.4 and 1.0
for most of the alternative speci￿cations. However, less robustness is found for
the transition countries. This holds especially true for the CEE-5, for which
GDP per capita turns out to be insigni￿cant both in the baseline and in al-
ternative speci￿cations. Although cointegration could not be ￿rmly established
for the Baltic countries, it is worth mentioning that GDP per capita is usually
statistically signi￿cant for this group as well as for the SEE-3. The fact that
the coe¢ cients￿size largely exceeds unity re￿ ects the upward bias due to quick
adjustment toward equilibrium. The results furthermore indicate that the bias
is substantially larger for the Baltic countries than for the SEE-3.
With regard to credit to the public sector, the estimations provide us with
some interesting insights, as an increase (decrease) in credit to the public sector
is found to cause a decline (rise) in private credit. This result is very robust
for emerging market economies and for the CEE-5, as the coe¢ cient estimates
are almost always negative and statistically signi￿cant across di⁄erent speci￿ca-
tions. This lends support to the crowding-out/crowding-in hypothesis in these
countries. Some empirical support for this hypothesis can be also established
for the advanced OECD and for emerging market economies. By contrast, the
estimated coe¢ cients are either not signi￿cant or have a positive sign for the
Baltic countries and for the SEE-3. This ￿nding potentially mirrors the very
low levels of public indebtedness of the three Baltic countries.
Let us now take a closer look at the nominal interest rate and at the in￿ ation
rate. In accordance with the results shown in Table 3 and in the Appendix C,
there is reasonably robust empirical support for nominal lending rates being
negatively linked to private credit in the CEE-5 as well as in emerging markets
and small OECD countries. In contrast, the ￿nding for the Baltic States and
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be statistically signi￿cant. Note that these results are not really a⁄ected by the
use of lending rates or short-term interest rates.
For emerging economies from Asia and the Americas, particularly strong
negative relationships are detected between the rate of in￿ ation and private
credit. Although less stable across di⁄erent speci￿cations and estimation meth-
ods, this negative relationship between in￿ ation and credit is also supported
by the data for the CEE-5 and for small OECD economies. By contrast, no
systematic pattern could be revealed for the Baltic and Southeastern European
countries.
An increase in ￿nancial liberalization, measured by a decline in spread, has
the expected positive impact on private credit in small OECD economies and in
the CEE-5, and also to some extent in the other transition economies. By con-
trast, the results for the ￿nancial liberalization index are less robust. Although
the ￿nancial liberalization index is positively associated with private credit in
OECD and emerging economies, it has an unexpected negative sign for all tran-
sition economies. An explanation for this may be the delay with which ￿nancial
liberalization measured by this index is transmitted to private credit, whereas
the spread variable captures the e⁄ective result of ￿nancial liberalization. The
same mismatch between OECD and transition economies can be seen for private
and public credit registries. While changes in credit registries produce the ex-
pected e⁄ect on private credit in OECD countries, the estimation results show
the opposite happening in the transition economies.
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￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿4 ￿5
Large OECD
FE_OLS 0.422*** -0.198*** -0.028 -0.394* -0.050***
DOLS 0.391*** -0.034*** 0.120*** 0.241 0.171***
MGE 0.040 0.118 -0.016 -2.611** 0.207*
Small OECD
FE_OLS 0.480*** -0.170*** -0.068*** -0.178 -0.037***
DOLS 0.540*** -0.065*** -0.082 0.678*** -0.143***
MGE 0.643*** 0.057 -0.171 -1.272 0.281
Emerging market economies
FE_OLS 0.492*** -0.120*** 0.136*** -0.263*** 0.069**
DOLS 0.715*** -0.064*** 0.187*** -0.436*** -0.001
MGE 0.583*** -0.386*** 0.454 -0.492*** -1.172
CEE-11
FE_OLS 1.648*** 0.053** 0.297*** -0.046 -0.640***
DOLS 0.981*** -0.169*** 0.125 -0.105 -0.382***
MGE 2.043 -0.114 -0.027*** -0.263 -0.907**
CEE-5
FE_OLS 0.169 -0.276*** -0.031 -1.179*** -0.407***
DOLS 0.375*** -0.308*** -0.046 1.062*** -0.109*
MGE -1.076 -0.222*** -0.057*** 1.501 -0.985**
B-3
FE_OLS 2.554*** 0.024 0.369*** 0.396* -0.458***
DOLS 2.227*** -0.121 0.083** -1.676*** -0.481***
MGE 4.045 0.313 -0.124*** -2.852 -1.466
SEE
FE_OLS 2.049*** 0.455*** 0.218*** -0.102** -0.366***
DOLS 0.745*** 0.013 -0.298 -0.479 -0.737***
MGE 1.654*** 0.264 0.120 -0.616** 0.217
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical signi￿cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% signi￿cance
levels, respectively. M is the panel including emerging market economies.
Because data on house prices are available only for developed OECD coun-
tries and for four transition economies (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary
and Lithuania), the estimations are performed only for large and small OECD
and transition economies. In addition, we constructed a panel including coun-
tries exhibiting large and persistent increases in house prices over the late 1990s,
possibly indicating the build-up of a real estate bubble (Canada, Spain, France,
the UK and the USA.). The results are not particularly robust for the small and
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di⁄erent estimation methods (Table 4). For transition economies, even though
the results are somewhat more encouraging, as the coe¢ cient is always posi-
tively signed if it is found to be statistically signi￿cant, the estimated equations
seem to be rather fragile in general.
Now, if we look at the group of countries with large increases in house prices,
it turns out that house prices are positively correlated in a robust fashion with
private credit, and that the other coe¢ cient estimates are also in line with
our earlier ￿ndings. However, the fact that the inclusion of house prices yields
robust results only if large increases have taken place on the property markets
might suggest that house prices mostly matter for private credit in the event of
a possible housing market bubble.
Table 4. Estimation Results ￿Equation 8; Housing Prices





￿ ￿1 ￿2 ￿3 ￿4 ￿5 ￿6
Small OECD economies
FE_OLS 0.611*** -0.166*** -0.098*** -0.125 -0.010 -0.062**
DOLS 0.286*** -0.064 -0.043 0.086 -0.081 0.399***
MGE -0.207*** 0.033 0.203*** -0.277** -0.548 -0.080 0.587***
Large OECD countries
FE_OLS 0.078* -0.209*** -0.022 -0.855*** 0.007 0.290***
DOLS 0.395*** -0.079*** -0.041* -0.345 -0.040 -0.161**
MGE -0.181*** -0.360 -0.049 -0.097* -2.397*** 0.139 0.544**
OECD economies with high growth rates in housing prices
FE_OLS 0.111* -0.160*** -0.066** -0.787*** -0.025 0.336***
DOLS 0.334*** -0.171*** -0.043** -0.412 0.022 0.040*
MGE -0.176*** -0.838 -0.146*** -0.235** -2.404** 0.432* 0.745**
CEE-4
FE_OLS 0.316 -0.429*** 0.032 -0.603*** -0.096 0.541***
DOLS 0.010*** -0.042*** 0.050 -0.563** 0.002 -0.018
MGE -0.125*** -0.651 -0.136*** -0.599*** 0.080 -0.359 0.561**
Note: ￿ is the error correction term. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signi￿cance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% signi￿cance levels, respectively.
5.2 Deviations from the Estimated Equilibrium Levels
We now turn to the comparison of the ￿tted values from the panel estimations
for the transition economies to the observed values for the transition economies.
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to-GDP ratio is from the estimated long-term value. As both the estimated
long-run coe¢ cients and the constant terms might be biased because of the
possibility of a large initial undershooting followed by a steady adjustment to-
ward equilibrium in transition economies, which is partly con￿rmed in Table 3,
we are cautious about the use of in-sample panel estimates, i.e. about using the
coe¢ cient estimates obtained for the transition panels. However, more impor-
tantly, it is the lack of robustness of the coe¢ cient estimates for the transition
economies that prevents us from relying on the in-sample panel estimations.
As Tables 3 and 4 and in the Appendix C show, there is no single equation
for transition economies in which all coe¢ cients are statistically signi￿cant and
have the expected sign.21
To overcome this problem, we could apply the out-of sample analysis, us-
ing two groups of countries, namely emerging market economies and OECD
countries. Emerging market economies might be expected to provide a natural
benchmark for CEE economies. However, the fact that some of the coe¢ cient
estimates for this panel are not signi￿cant or, importantly, have the wrong
sign these countries cannot be used as a benchmark. Therefore, we have ex-
perimented with a smaller panel including only small emerging markets (Chile,
Israel, Peru and South Africa) which could constitute a more meaningful bench-
mark, given the comparability of size and GDP per capita. Yet the coe¢ cient
estimates (not reported here) do not improve as the coe¢ cients on credit to the
government, the interest rate and the spread variable are either insigni￿cant or
have the wrong sign.
As a result, we are left with the OECD panels. The baseline speci￿cation
estimated by means of ￿xed e⁄ect OLS for small open OECD economies22 ap-
pears to be best suited, as this is the only equation where all coe¢ cients bear
the right sign and all but one are statistically signi￿cant (marked in green in
Table 3).23
21Note that the analogy with the literature on equilibrium exchange rates in transition
economies ends here, given that it is possible to establish robust relationships between the
real exchange rate and its most important fundamentals, such as for instance productivity
(see e.g. ￿gert, Halpern and MacDonald, 2006).
22Small OECD countries appear to be a reasonably useful benchmark, at least with respect
to longer-term equilibrium levels. It should be noted that CEE countries have undergone a
substantial convergence to small OECD countries in structural and institutional terms. As
a consequence, four of these countries - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia -
joined the OECD in the second half of the 1990s. Likewise, the EBRD transition indicators
(see EBRD 2005), the standard reference point for gauging progress with the structural and
institutional change in CEE countries, show that the countries under review in this study, in
particular the Central European and Baltic countries, plus Croatia, have made substantial
progress towards fully-￿edged market economies already in the second half of the 1990s, while
gradually advancing further in more recent years.
23Given that this relationship may have undergone some changes over time, we carried out
estimations for the following subperiods: 1980-2004; 1985-2004 and 1990-2004. The coe¢ -
cients do not change much both in terms of size and signi￿cance with the exception of the
spread variable which becomes insigni￿cant for 1985-2004 and for 1990-2004. Therefore, the
estimation obtained for the whole period seems reasonably stable and thus suitable for pro-
ceeding further with the analysis. We also carried out estimations for a panel composed of
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mates obtained for the small open OECD panel to derive the ￿tted value for
transition economies, the underlying assumption is that in the long run there is
parameter homogeneity between the small developed OECD panel and the tran-
sition countries. One might reasonably assume that in the long run (after ad-
justment toward equilibrium is completed) the behavior of transition economies
will be similar to the present behavior of small OECD countries. Even though
this homogeneity is ful￿lled between the two samples, the estimated long-run
values of the private credit-to-GDP ratio and the underlying deviation from
equilibrium should be interpreted from a long-run perspective.
Given that no country-speci￿c constant terms are available for the transition
economies, the next intricate issue is how constant terms should be applied to
derive the ￿tted values.24 Our safest bet is to use the largest and the smallest
constant terms (as well as the median constant term) obtained on the basis of
the small OECD panel, which gives us the whole spectrum of possible estimated
values for private credit.25
The derived range of deviation is plotted on Chart 4. The error margin
is, however, rather large. Consequently, if one considers midpoints, Croatia is
now the only country which might have reached equilibrium by 2004. When
looking at whole ranges, other countries, namely Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia and Slovenia, might have already reached equilibrium as well, while the
mass of the estimated deviation was still located mostly on the undershooting
side in 2004. At the same time, the upper edges of the estimated band come
close to equilibrium for Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland and Slovenia. Moreover, it
turns out that the initial overshooting might not have been that large for the
Czech Republic and Slovakia, after all. Finally, it is interesting to see that
the initial undershooting remains relatively stable for Lithuania, Poland and
Romania throughout the period.
catching-up EU countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain). However, the results (not reported
here) appear to be not very robust.
24Note that Cottarelli et al. (2005), the ￿rst paper which derives the equilibrium level of
private credit for transition economies, does not address the issue of the constant terms.
25Another reason for selecting the baseline speci￿cation is that the variables included are all
expressed in levels, which ensures that the constant terms derived on this basis have a cross-
sectional meaning. For instance, the constants would not have any cross-sectional meaning if
indices with a base year were used (e.g. for industrial production or house prices).
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Note: negative values indicate that the observed private credit to GDP ratio is lower than
what a particular country￿ s GDP per capita would predict (￿undervaluation￿)
Conversely, positive ￿gures show an ￿overvaluation￿ of the private credit to GDP ratio.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the equilibrium level of private credit to GDP in
11 transition economies from CEE on the basis of a number of dynamic panels
containing quarterly data for transition economies, developed OECD economies
and emerging markets, and relying on a framework including both factors that
capture the demand for and the supply of private credit.
Credit to the public sector (crowding out/crowding in), nominal interest
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at capturing ￿nancial liberalization and competition in the banking sector turn
out to be the major determinants of credit growth in the CEE-5, while GDP
per capita is the only variable that enters the estimated equations in a robust
manner for the Baltic and Southeastern European countries. Furthermore, we
￿nd the estimated coe¢ cients for transition economies are much higher than
those obtained for OECD and emerging market economies, which testi￿es to
the bias caused by the initial undershooting of private credit to GDP in most
countries. Another interesting result is that house prices are found to lead to an
increase in private credit only in countries with high house price in￿ ation. This
￿nding disquali￿es the house price variable from being included in the long-run
equation to be used for the derivation of the equilibrium level of private credit.
We have emphasized that relying on in-sample panel estimates of the equi-
librium level of private credit for transition economies is problematic not only
because of the possible bias which shows up in the estimated coe¢ cients due to
the initial undershooting, but also because the equations estimated for transi-
tion economies are not su¢ ciently stable. To overcome these problems, we used
small open OECD countries as a benchmark to derive the equilibrium level
of private credit for transition economies as our intention to use the emerg-
ing markets panel as the benchmark was thwarted by the lack of robustness
of the empirical results. Another reason for using the small OECD panel as a
benchmark is the following. Transition economies are expected to converge in
behavior to this panel in the longer run. Hence, such a panel provides us with
coe¢ cient estimates that can be used to infer equilibrium credit-to-GDP ratios
which apply in the long run for transition economies.
We can draw some general conclusions with regard to undershooting and
overshooting for transition economies, even though the application of the out-
of-sample small open OECD panel to transition economies yields a wide corridor
of deviations from the equilibrium. Considering the midpoint of the estimated
interval, Croatia is the only country which might have reached the equilibrium
by 2004. When looking at whole ranges, the upper edges of the estimated
band reached equilibrium in Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia,
although the mass of the estimated deviation was still located mostly on the
undershooting side in 2004. Moreover, it turns out that the initial overshooting
might not have been that large for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, after all.
Finally, it is interesting to see that the initial undershooting remains relatively
stable for Lithuania, Poland and Romania throughout the period. Overall,
our results suggest that the CEE countries cannot be generally regarded as
(over)shooting stars in terms of their credit-to-GDP ratios despite robust credit
growth observed in most of the countries. However, Croatia seems to outcom-
pete the other countries in the pursuit of the title of an (over)shooting star,
albeit Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovenia are still trying hard to
￿ght back.
The prospects for the future are that credit growth will very likely remain
rapid in CEE or to accelerate further in those countries where it is still compar-
atively moderate, given that the underlying factors which support private sector
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the rapid pace of credit expansion and its persistence in a number of countries
does by itself pose the risk of a deterioration of asset quality. Moreover, it ex-
poses lenders and borrowers to risks because of an increase in unhedged foreign
currency lending. Furthermore, the rapid adjustment process toward equilib-
rium levels may trigger demand booms, causing current account de￿cits to move
above levels that can be sustained over a longer period of time. However, we
leave it to future research to determine empirically the optimal speed of adjust-
ment toward equilibrium that does not jeopardize macroeconomic and ￿nancial
stability.
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8.1 Data Appendix
8.1.1 Data Sources and De￿nitions
Quarterly data for bank credit to the private sector, credit to the government
sector, short-term and long-term interest rate series, the consumer and producer
price indices (CPI and PPI), real and nominal GDP, and industrial production
are obtained from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF accessed
via the database of the Austrian Institute for Economic Research (WIFO).26
For some emerging markets, industrial production data is not available from
this source, and hence are obtained from national data sources. In￿ ation is
computed as a year-on-year rate (pt ￿ pt￿4). Lending rates are based on bank
lending rates, and wherever not available, long-term government bond yields
are used instead. Three-month treasury bill rates, and wherever not available,
money market rates, are employed for short-term interest rates. The spread
is calculated using lending (or, wherever not available, long-term government
bond yields) and deposit rates.
GDP per capita expressed in PPS against the euro and the U.S. dollar is
drawn from the AMECO database of the European Commission and the World
Economic Indicators of the World Bank, respectively. The data start in 1975
for OECD countries and the emerging markets and in the 1990s for transition
economies. The data are linearly interpolated from annual to quarterly frequen-
cies. The ￿nancial liberalization index (from 0 to 20) reported in Abiad and
Mody (2003) and used in Cottarelli et al. (2005) is used for OECD and emerg-
ing market economies. The data cover the period from 1975 to 1996 and are
available for all emerging countries and for nine OECD economies, namely the
large OECD countries plus Canada, Australia and New Zealand. For the tran-
sition economies, the average of the liberalization index of the banking sector
and that of the ￿nancial sector provided by the EBRD from 1990 to 2004 are
used (rescaled from the range 1 to 4+ to the range 0 to 20, which corresponds
to the scaling used in Abiad and Mody, 2003). The data are linearly interpo-
lated from annual to quarterly frequencies. Data for the existence of public and
private credit registries are taken from Djankov et al. (2005), who provide data
for 1999 and 2003. The series we use can take three values: 0 in the absence of
both public and private registries; 1 if either public or private credit registries
are in operation and 2 if both exist. This variable basically captures whether
a change between 1999 and 2003 alters the supply of credit during this period.
GDP per capita, the ￿nancial liberalization index and the registry variable are
transformed to a quarterly frequency by means of linear interpolation.
House prices are not available for emerging countries and for Italy. For tran-
26IFS codes: Bank credit to the private sector: lines 22d and 22g; credit to the government:
lines 22a, 22b and 22c; interest rates: lines 60b, 60c, 60l, 60p and 61; CPI and PPI: lines
64 and 63; nominal GDP: lines 99b and 99b.c; real GDP: lines 99bvp and 99bvr; industrial
production in industry: lines 66, 66..c and 66ey (in manufacturing).
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Hungary and Lithuania. Quarterly data for the OECD economies are obtained
from the Macroeconomic Database of the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS) and Datastream. The source of the data is the respective central banks
for the Czech Republic, France, Hungary and Lithuania and the national sta-
tistical o¢ ce for Estonia.
8.1.2 The Span of the Data
Starting dates (the series end in 2004:q4 if not indicated otherwise)
Private credit (the same applies to public credit if not indicated other-
wise in parentheses):
OECD: 1975:q1- 2004:q4;
Emerging markets: 1975:q1- 2004:q4 except for ARG: 1982:q3 (1983:q3);
BR: 1988:q3 (1989:q3); INDO: 1980:q3; PE: 1984:q1 (1985:q1); TK: 1990:q1
(1987:q4)
Transition economies: HU, PL: 1990:Q4; BG, EE, SI: 1991:q4; LT: 1993:q1;
LV: 1993:q3; CZ, SK: 1993:q4; HR: 1993:q4 (1994:q2); EE: 1991; RO: 1996:q4.
Spread (in parentheses for spread2 if di⁄erent):
OECD: 1975:q1 except for DE: 1977:q3; NO: 1979:q1; IE:1979:q3; FI, NE:
1981:q1; NZ: 1981:q4; ES: 1982:q1; IT: 1982:q3
Emerging markets: INDO, KO, PH: 1975:q1; CH, TH: 1977:q1; SA: 1977:q4;
IND, ME: 1978:q1; IS: 1983:q1; PE: 1988:q1; ARG: 1993:q2; BR: 1997:q1; TK:
not available
Transition economies: HU, PL: 1990:q1; BG: 1991:q1; SI: 1991:q4; HR:
1992:q1; CZ, LT, SK: 1993:q1; EE: 1993:q2; LV: 1993:q3; RO: 1995:q4.
PPI (CPI, industrial production (IP), if di⁄erent):
OECD: 1975:q1 except for PPI in NO, NZ: 1977:q1; BE: 1980:q1; IT: 1981:q1
Emerging markets: 1975:q1 except for ARG: 1987:q1 (1994:q1; NA); BR:
1992:q1 (1992:q1, 1991:q1); CH: 1976:q1 (1976:q1, 1975:q1); INDO: IP:1976:q1;
IS: IP not available; KO: IP: 1980:q1; PE: 1980:q1 (1980:q1, 1979:q1); PH:
1993:q1 (1975:q1, 1981:q1); TK: 1987:q1 (1987:q1, 1980:q1)
Transition economies: BG: 1991:q1; CZ: 1993:q1; HR: 1993:q1; EE: 1993:q1
(1992:q1, 1993:q1); HU: 1990:q1; LV: 1994: q1 (1992:q1,1993:q1); LT: 1993:q1;
PL: 1991:q1; RO: 1992:q1; SK: 1991:q1 (1993:q1, 1990:q1); SI: 1992:q1.
Real GDP:
OECD: 1975:q1 except for BE: 1980:q1; DK, PT: 1977:q1 and NZ: 1982: q2
Emerging markets: IND, IS, KO: 1975:q1; CH, ME: 1980:q1; PE: 1979:q1;
PH: 1981:q1; TK: 1987:q1; BR: 1990:q1; ARG, INDO, TH: 1993:q1
Transition economies: SI: 1992:q1; HR, EE, LV, LT, RO, SK: 1993:q1; CZ:
1994:q1, HU, PL: 1995:q1; Data for India and Romania are linearly interpolated
from annual to quarterly frequency.
All series stop in 2004:q4.
GDP per capita in PPS:
Data based on the euro for transition economies: CZ, PL, RO: 1990; BG,
HU, SI: 1991; LV, LT: 1992; EE, SK: 1993; HR: 1995
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BG, EE, LV, LT, SK, SI: 1991; CZ: 1992.
Housing prices:
OECD: The starting date of the series is as follows: DK, DE, NE, SUI,
UK, US: 1975:q1; JP: 1977:q1; SA: 1980:q1; FR: 1980:q4; CA: 1981:q1; FI:
1983:q1; SE: 1986:q1; AUS: 1986:q2; ES: 1987:q1, AT: 1987:q2; PT: 1988:q1;
NZ: 1989:q4; IE: 1990:q1; BE, NO: 1991:q4; GR: 1994:q1. The series stop in
2004:q4.
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Table A3. Estimation Results – Eq2 to Eq3
ip G C
lending i




FE_OLS 0.655*** -0.206*** -0.031 -1.643*** 0.013 0.557*** -0.202*** -0.055* -1.296*** -0.026
DOLS 0.925*** 0.018 0.143*** -0.635*** 0.120*** 0.700*** 0.023 0.184*** -0.897*** 0.158***
MGE 0.390 0.130 0.056 -3.480*** 0.364** 0.067 0.119 -0.022 -2.406** 0.316*
Small OECD
FE_OLS 0.767*** -0.115*** -0.089*** -0.888*** -0.134*** 1.163*** -0.099*** 0.029* -0.334*** -0.108***
DOLS 1.113*** -0.011 0.029** 0.024 0.038** 1.272*** 0.036** 0.038*** 0.306*** -0.119
MGE 2.533*** 0.254* 0.024 -2.903* 0.945** 2.111*** 0.018 0.101 -1.169 0.458
Emerging market economies
FE_OLS 0.483*** -0.097*** 0.078*** -0.416*** -0.003 0.419*** -0.119*** 0.097*** -0.150** 0.019
DOLS 0.589*** -0.006*** 0.077*** -0.503*** -0.201*** 0.729*** -0.030*** 0.133*** -0.212* -0.148***
MGE 0.502*** -0.253*** 0.867 -0.333*** -0.555 0.109*** -0.089*** 0.885** -0.908** -0.986
CEE-5
FE_OLS -0.105 -0.293*** -0.181*** -1.202*** -0.379*** 0.639*** -0.282*** -0.086 -1.018*** -0.472***
DOLS 0.158 -0.347*** -0.050 0.848*** -0.121** 0.980*** -0.109 0.089 1.012*** -0.198***
MGE -1.088* -0.467*** -0.830** 1.030 -1.157 0.830 0.065 -0.067*** 0.056 -0.587*
B-3
FE_OLS 1.589*** -0.004 -0.290*** 0.621* -0.463*** 2.771*** 0.006 0.128 0.411 -0.376***
DOLS 1.905*** -0.087 0.371*** -3.927*** 0.709*** 3.169*** -0.076 0.423*** -1.885*** -0.184
MGE 1.198 2.772** -2.259 -3.632*** 0.827 12.374** 1.258* -0.757 -4.716*** -1.985
SEE
FE_OLS 0.908*** 0.096 -0.729 0.166 -1.349*** 3.464*** 0.129 0.308** -1.920*** 0.159
DOLS 0.973*** 0.110 -0.682 0.140 -1.247*** 3.464*** 0.129 0.308** -1.920*** 0.159
MGE 2.174** -0.197 0.091 -1.799 0.722 4.023*** -0.145 0.431 -2.743** 0.231
Notes: *,** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. See also Table 4.
Table A4. Estimation Results – Eq4 to Eq5
capita G C
term short i




FE_OLS 0.426*** -0.202*** 0.027 -0.520** 0.005 0.362*** -0.201*** 0.037 -1.687*** -0.024
DOLS 0.412*** -0.002*** 0.071*** 0.122 0.206** 0.361*** -0.025*** 0.177*** -0.681** 0.155***
MGE 0.007 0.147 0.097 -2.471** 0.288*** 0.044 0.150 0.088 -2.788*** 0.198**
Small OECD
FE_OLS 0.501*** -0.177*** -0.054*** -0.173 -0.045*** 0.544*** -0.157*** -0.110*** 1.181*** -0.039***
DOLS 0.447*** -0.085*** -0.105*** 0.741*** -0.112*** 0.626*** -0.002*** -0.149*** 1.645*** -0.165***
MGE 0.686*** 0.045 -0.060 -0.103 0.222 0.756*** 0.573* -0.165 -1.196 -0.592
Emerging market economies
FE_OLS 0.508*** -0.237*** 0.004 0.115* 0.112*** 0.485*** -0.082*** 0.143*** -0.414*** 0.065*
DOLS 0.621*** -0.049*** -0.089 0.319* 0.023 0.716*** -0.032*** 0.041* -0.327*** -0.018
MGE 0.426*** -0.521*** -0.360 -0.852 -1.352 0.813*** -0.034*** 0.239 -1.171*** -0.176
CEE-5
FE_OLS 0.102 -0.288*** -0.085** -1.154*** -0.476*** 0.210 -0.272*** 0.005 -1.095*** -0.412***
DOLS -0.280 -0.272*** 0.040 0.211 -0.057 0.207** -0.263*** -0.135 0.467** -0.296***
MGE 0.019 -0.216** -0.105*** -0.729 -0.619 -5.367* -0.401*** -0.776*** -12.111 -3.641**
B-3
FE_OLS 2.148*** 0.021 0.217*** 0.581** -0.192** 2.611*** 0.005 0.479*** -0.385* -0.522***
DOLS 2.183*** -0.179 0.002 -1.625*** -0.337 2.018*** 0.121 0.160*** -1.375*** -0.011
MGE 4.174 0.313 -0.759 -5.100** -1.178* -3.755 0.285 -0.344 -7.268 -0.905
SEE
FE_OLS 0.678*** 0.009 -0.354 -0.953** -1.024*** 1.217*** 0.073 -0.024 0.099 -0.463***
DOLS 0.678*** 0.009 -0.354 -0.953** -1.024*** 1.217*** 0.073 -0.024 0.099 -0.463***
MGE 1.539*** 0.284 0.058 -0.654** -0.204 0.911** 0.548 -0.546 -0.112 0.245
Notes: See Table A3.
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capita G C term long i - PPI p finlib capita G C term long i - PPI p spread reg
Large OECD
FE_OLS 0.381*** -0.285*** 0.015 0.022 0.111*** 0.484*** -0.174*** -0.067*** -0.165 -0.036*** 0.236***
DOLS 0.435*** 0.012 0.122*** -0.660*** -0.304*** 0.180*** -0.006 0.059*** -0.120 0.025 0.042
MGE 0.405 0.041 0.160 -0.583*** 0.084 -0.237 0.144 -0.089 -1.365 0.088 -0.064
Small OECD
FE_OLS 0.483*** -0.088*** -0.131*** 0.192 0.223*** 0.484*** -0.174*** -0.067*** -0.165 -0.036*** 0.236***
DOLS 2.337*** -2.619* 2.274 2.076 4.722 0.059*** 0.006 0.024*** 0.006 0.008 0.011
MGE 1.077 -0.283 -0.463 -0.638 0.307*** 0.038 0.074 0.005 -0.209 0.024 -0.015
Emerging market economies
FE_OLS 0.269*** 0.069*** -0.035** 0.137*** 0.302*** -- -- -- -- -- --
DOLS 3.081*** -3.117*** 2.640 -2.313*** 5.679 -- -- -- -- -- --
MGE 1.084 -1.846 -0.152** -0.379 0.141** -- -- -- -- -- --
CEE-5
FE_OLS 0.663*** -0.298*** -0.008 -1.412*** -0.985*** 0.220* -0.257*** -0.011 -1.096*** -0.208* -0.119**
DOLS 0.906*** -0.408*** -0.121 0.698 -1.304*** 0.253** -0.068 0.222*** 0.104 -0.069 -0.146***
MGE -19.708 -1.645** -8.252*** 2.034 -4.405 0.139 0.015 0.232** -0.183 0.001** -0.170***
B-3
FE_OLS 2.713*** -0.085* 0.485*** 0.694** -0.013 2.580*** 0.012 0.412*** 0.619** -0.394*** 0.157
DOLS 2.002*** 0.123 0.135* -1.924*** -0.041 0.439 0.254** 0.152*** -1.739** 0.017 -0.005***
MGE 2.828 0.353 -0.735*** -2.427 -0.312*** 0.377 0.640* 0.500 -4.486 0.767 -0.565**
SEE
FE_OLS 1.792*** 0.053* 0.101 -0.221 -3.087*** 1.919 0.182** 0.120*** 0.334 -0.828*** -0.269***
DOLS 1.792*** 0.053* 0.101 -0.221 -3.087*** 1.919 0.182** 0.120*** 0.334 -0.828*** -0.269***
MGE 2.523** -0.432 1.600** -1.588** -0.160 4.965*** 0.470*** 1.015*** -0.907*** 0.112 -0.577***
Notes: See Table A3.
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